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Abstract 
The use of personal connections to gain preferential access to goods and services and to circumvent 
formal procedures exists in all countries to varying degrees. In this paper, the aim is to critically evaluate 
the continuing widespread positive depiction of this practice as a form of friendly help. Studying the health 
services sector in the city of Mykolayiv in Ukraine, this practice known as blat, which was widely used in 
Soviet societies to gain access to goods and services, is shown to persist in post-Soviet market societies, 
albeit transformed. Those possessing connections and access to health services now increasingly view 
such access-assets as commodities to sell rather than provide them as non-monetised friendly favours. 
The outcome is a call for blat to be re-theorised more negatively as an exemplar of the darker side of social 
capital, and for a policy shift from doing nothing to seeking its eradication.
Keywords: social capital, blat, guanxi, wasta, corruption, nepotism, cronyism; informal economy, health 
services, Ukraine.
Introduction
The practice of using personal networks to gain preferential access to goods and services, or to 
circumvent formal procedures, exists in all societies to a varying extent. This is variously referred to as 
guanxi in China (Chen, Friedman, Yu & Sun, 2011; Chen, Chen & Huang 2012; Luo, 2011; Yang & Wang, 
2011), wasta in Arab countries (Smith et al., 2011), jeitinho in Brazil (Ardichvili et al., 2010; Ferreira, 
Fischer, Barreiros Porto, Pilati & Milfont, 2012), ‘pulling strings’ in English speaking countries (Smith 
et al., 2012), and blat in post-Soviet spaces (Ledeneva, 2008, 2009, 2013; Polese, 2008). The starting 
point of this paper is the recognition that in most societies using connections to gain preferential 
access and/or to circumvent formal procedures is construed in neutral or positive terms as a form 
of harmless friendly help rather than as an example of the darker side of social capital and a form of 
nepotism, cronyism and corruption hindering meritocratic processes. The aim of this paper, however, 
is to critically evaluate the widespread positive portrayal of this practice by examining the practice of 
blat, which refers to ‘the use of personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply, 
or for circumventing formal procedures’ (Ledeneva, 2013, p 273) in the post-Soviet world. Until now, 
there have been few, if any, in-depth contemporary studies of the prevalence and nature of blat in 
post-Soviet societies (Aliyev, 2014). To start to fi ll this gap, we here report a study of its usage and 
character when acquiring health services in the city of Mykolayiv in Ukraine. The intention in so doing 
is to display how a social networking practice, namely the use of personal connections to circumvent 
formal procedures, can be transformed as a society undergoes the transition from being a neutral or 
positive practice into a negative practice displaying the ‘darker side’ of social capital. The outcome 
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will be to display the constant need to revisit the nature and meaning of specifi c practices since an 
acceptable behaviour in a society can quickly become a very diff erent and unacceptable behaviour as 
that society changes.
In the fi rst section of this paper, therefore, we review the existing literature on the use of personal 
networks to gain preferential access to goods and services or to circumvent formal procedures, with 
a particular focus on the use of blat in the Soviet and post-Soviet world and its usage in the health 
services sector. This reveals that although blat remains widely viewed either neutrally or positively as 
a form of friendly help, blat is thought to be changing in post-Soviet market societies into a monetised 
practice in which connections and access to assets are treated as commodities to be sold (Arnstberg & 
Boren, 2003; Ledeneva, 2008, 2013; Mikhailova & Worm, 2003; Smith & Stenning, 2006). Nevertheless, 
until now in-depth empirical studies of the contemporary character of blat are notable by their 
absence. In the second section, therefore, we present the methodology employed to study the use of 
blat when acquiring health services in the city of Mykaelaiv in Ukraine. Reporting the results, the third 
section reveals that although traditional style non-monetised blat comprising friendly help still exists 
when helping close social relations, those possessing connections and access to health services now 
view such access-assets as commodities that they sell for informal payments when distant contacts 
seek access. The fi nal section then draws some conclusions regarding the need not only to re-theorise 
blat but also for a policy shift from doing nothing to pursuing its eradication.
The use of personal networks to circumvent formal procedures: a review of the 
literature
Ever since the studies by Stack (1974) and Young and Wilmott (1975), social networks have been 
recognised as resources that people can draw upon to meet their needs. This early work emphasised 
the benefi cial eff ects that arise from the friendly help provided by and for close ties. In recent decades, 
however, the literature on social capital has also highlighted the benefi cial eff ects that arise when 
ties are forged between people who do not know each other very well (Putnam, 2000), or what 
Granovetter (1973) calls the ‘strength of weak ties’. The outcome has been a widespread recognition 
of the benefi cial eff ects of the friendly help provided by not only close ties (i.e. ‘bonding’ social capital) 
but also the weaker ties of people who do not know each other well (i.e. ‘bridging’ social capital) 
(Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Putnam, 2000).
Analysing social capital from an ethics perspective (Ayios, Jeuirssen, Manning & Spence, 2014), 
however, a small number of emergent literature has begun to unpack how social capital also has a 
more negative ‘dark side’ (Garigiulo & Benassi, 1997; Gu, Hung & Tse, 2008; Putzel, 1997; Schulman 
& Anderson, 2009). This has revealed how the use of personal networks can result in nepotism (i.e. 
favouritism based on kinship), cronyism (i.e. partiality to close friends and acquaintances), and/or 
corruption (i.e. the use of public offi  ce for private advantage) and as a result hinder meritocratic 
processes (Ayios et al., 2014; Moran, 1999).  
In this paper, the argument is that studying how social networks are used to gain preferential 
access to goods and services or to circumvent formal procedures may also contribute to understanding 
this ‘darker side’ of social capital. Nearly all languages have a phrase for this practice. In China, it is 
referred to as guanxi (‘connections’) which describes a network of contacts from which an individual 
can obtain favours in terms of accessing a good or service or bypassing bureaucratic procedures, 
which they must then reciprocate in the future (Hsuing, 2013; Mikhailova & Worm, 2003). Indeed, 
the literature on guanxi displays its widespread importance and permeation of Chinese culture and 
business (Luo, 2011; Luo, Huang & Lu Wang, 2011; Song, Bram Cadsby & Bi, 2011; Shou, Chen, Zhu & 
Yang, 2014; Zhan, 2012). Although its centrality in Chinese culture is sometimes lamented, such as 
when nepotism prevails in recruitment processes (Chen et al., 2011), few studies call for its eradication. 
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Refl ecting the view of the Chinese population in general, most studies simply see it as an unavoidable 
and self-evident feature of Chinese culture that needs recognising when doing business (Chen et al., 
2012; Munro Duckett, Hunt & Sutton, 2013; Yang & Wang, 2011; Zhuang, Xi & Tsang, 2010).  
In Arab countries, meanwhile, the common term for using one’s connections rooted in family 
and kinship ties to sidestep formal procedures is wasta (Hutchings & Weir, 2006; Smith et al., 2011) 
or ma’arifa in North African nations such as Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (Mellahi & Wood, 2006; 
Yahiaoui & Zoubir, 2006). Again, most studies in Arab countries reveal a neutral or positive attitude 
of the population towards its usage (Bailey, 2012; Barnett, Yandle & Naufal, 2013; Kilani & Sakijha, 
2002; Mohamed & Mohamed, 2011; Tlaiss & Kauser, 2011). Interestingly, few if any studies call for 
its suppression, despite the absence of a ‘no nepotism’ policy in the Arab business world and the 
widespread use of favouritism, rather than merit, in hiring and promotion decisions. 
Furthermore, in Brazil and other Portuguese speaking countries, the term commonly used is either 
pistolão (‘contacts’) or jeitinho (‘fi nd a way’) when referring to the use of connections to fi nd a way 
to circumvent formal bureaucratic procedures. Again, the widespread view of its usage is generally 
neutral or positive, rather than negative. It is widely viewed as a helpful coping practice used by 
people confronted with diffi  culties in accessing goods, services, and bureaucratic formal procedures 
(Ardichvili et al., 2010). 
In English-speaking countries, the term ‘pulling strings’ is used, referring to the process by which 
one obtains favours through links with infl uential persons, and these links may be longstanding ones, 
deriving from family connections or shared schooling, but they may also develop from short-term 
contacts (Smith et al., 2012). Although there has been no empirical research on the prevalence or 
nature of this practice in the English-speaking world, a cross-national comparative study of attitudes 
reveals that English people view the use of connections to circumvent formal procedures more 
positively than the Chinese, Arabs and Brazilians (Smith et al., 2012). 
In all societies, therefore, this practice is widely construed in neutral or positive terms as a form 
of friendly help to enable those connected to get by or get ahead. Even though populations recognise 
this practice as a form of nepotism, cronyism and/or corruption, rarely is it negatively depicted and 
seldom is attention drawn to its problems in hindering meritocratic processes. Indeed, no known 
studies have considered it as an example of the ‘darker side’ of social capital. To start to explain why 
this is the case, attention now turns to the conceptualisation of this practice in Soviet and post-Soviet 
societies. 
The role of blat in Soviet and post-Soviet countries
In the Soviet and post-Soviet world, using personal networks to obtain goods and services in short 
supply, or for circumventing formal procedures, is widely referred to as blat (Arnstberg & Boren, 2003; 
Ledeneva, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2013; Mikhailova & Worm, 2003; Smith et al., 2011). Although it is a cliché 
to typify the ex-Soviet world as having possessed high levels of state control over the everyday lives of 
its citizens, managers at all levels tended to use informal practices to fi ll gaps left by the command 
economy and to allow the state system to function. Indeed, under the Soviet system money had 
relatively little value given the shortage of goods to purchase. It was much more important to have 
a wide network of friends and acquaintances to call upon in times of need, and a commonly heard 
phrase during the Soviet period was ‘it is better to have a hundred friends than a hundred roubles’. 
Indeed, having friends in strategic places was very important, as it was not money that posed the 
main problem, but the shortage of goods and services, and one of the only routes used to gain access 
to these was through personal connections. Indeed, almost every worker had access to some form of 
asset that they used in blat (Arnstberg & Boren, 2003).
Given the limitations of the command economy, blat networks thus ‘loosened up the rigid 
constraints of the political regime’ (Ledeneva, 2009, p 257). Indeed, this was a ubiquitous practice. 
Blat was required to negotiate almost all aspects of life from acquiring everyday goods such as food 
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and periodic events such as holidays to life-cycle events such as obtaining kindergarten and university 
places. As Ledeneva (2008, p 123) states, ‘Their pervasive use as a “safety-net” or “survival kit” made 
involvement in informal practices compulsory rather than voluntary’. Thus, blat in its traditional 
meaning in Soviet society was widely viewed in a positive or neutral manner since it helped people to 
cope with the ineffi  ciencies of the command economy. Blat was seen as a practice largely based on 
social motives and in Soviet societies the ability to take care of friends through blat was an important 
status symbol and source of pride and prestige for those able to help others (Williams, Round & 
Rodgers, 2013).
Following the collapse of the Soviet system and the faltering transition to the market, one might 
expect the importance of blat to have declined. After all, it emerged and was a direct product of the 
economy of shortages. The consensus in the literature, however, is that in post-Soviet societies, even if 
money now plays a greater role in accessing goods and services and circumventing formal procedures, 
blat persists but its character has changed (Ledeneva, 2013). 
In the Soviet period, the goal of blat was supposedly friendly help that would enable people to gain 
access to goods and services or to circumvent formal procedures through their personal network. 
In post-Soviet market societies, however, the argument is that connections and access to assets are 
increasingly treated as a commodity, with gifts and/or money received and given (Arnstberg & Boren, 
2003; Ledeneva, 2009, 2013). Thus, as the benefi ts of gaining access to a bank loan, health services, 
educational places and a job now have fi nancial returns, the view is that providing access to assets is 
no longer purely about friendly help but is now reimbursed in the form of money, as Al Ramahi (2008) 
has also noted in the case of wasta. The argument is that as a consequence those occupying positions 
that can provide access to assets are using them to accumulate money in the new market societies 
(Smith & Stenning, 2006). The result, as Mikhailova & Worm (2003, p 517) argue, is that
blat is losing its warm, human face and becoming increasingly ‘materialized’. The transformation of its 
nature from being based on moral and ethical considerations to having an explicit fi nancial expression 
is a phenomenon in itself.
Although this depiction of blat as wholly non-monetised in the Soviet era and becoming wholly 
monetised in the contemporary period is doubtful, with the encroachment of money into the provision 
of access to assets, blat is nevertheless slowly acquiring a more negative meaning in the post-Soviet 
world, especially among young educated people (Arnstberg & Boren, 2003; Ledeneva, 2013). It is now 
more associated with corruption, by which is meant the use of public offi  ce for private advantage, not 
only in a pecuniary sense but also in terms of status and infl uence (Ledeneva, 2009). 
Until now however, in-depth empirical studies of the extent and nature of blat in contemporary 
post-Society societies are notable by their absence. Here therefore, the intention is to begin to fi ll 
that gap. To do this, we focus upon a sector in which blat purportedly remains widely used, namely 
the health services sector (see Ledeneva, 2013). Reviewing recent studies on corruption in the health 
services sector both in transition economies and beyond, the a priori assumption has been that blat has 
disappeared. Indeed, no studies even consider the role played by blat or its contemporary character. 
Instead, the assumption is that bribes in the form of illicit monetary payments have replaced blat. 
As a consequence, the focus is upon the prevalence of informal payments in enabling patients to 
jump the queue, receive better care or just simply receive any care at all (Balabanova & McKee, 2002; 
Gordeev, Pavlova & Groot, 2014; Kaitelidou et al., 2012; Lewis, 2010; Moldovan and Van de Walle, 2013; 
Morris & Polese, 2014; Stepurko, Pavlova, Levenets, Gryga & Groot, 2013). These studies show how 
attitudes towards such informal payments range from strongly negative if the demand for payment 
is initiated by the professional, to tolerant if patient-initiated (Atanasova, Pavlova, Moutafova, Rechel 
& Groot, 2013; Balabanova & McKee, 2002). Indeed, it appears that money is often now suffi  cient for 
achieving what before required access to personal networks to attain (Morris & Polese, 2014). The 
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view therefore, is that informal payments are replacing blat.
Based on this review of blat in general, and corruption in the health services sector in particular, 
four hypotheses are proposed for investigation:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): blat remains commonly used in the health services sector.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): those with connections and access to health services now treat them as 
commodities to sell rather than provide them as a friendly favour.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): the informal payments made for providing access to health services are bribes, 
not gifts received for providing friendly help.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): informal payments have replaced blat as a tool for gaining access to health 
services.
Methodology: studying blat in Ukraine’s health services sector
To examine the use of blat in Ukraine’s health services sector, we here report the results of a survey 
conducted in 2009 in the city of Mykolayiv, a regional centre in the south of Ukraine with a population 
of 498,700 people. During the Soviet period, Mykolayiv was a prosperous shipbuilding centre of the 
Soviet Union with three shipbuilding yards, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, production 
volumes have decreased dramatically as well as the population employed at these plants. The result 
has been that Mykolayiv, akin to elsewhere in Ukraine, has witnessed a growth in unemployment and 
struggled to fi nd a new economic role for itself in the post-Soviet world (see Onoshchenko, 2012).
Sampling and data collection
To collect data, the fi rst stage involved 200 face-to-face structured interviews composed mostly of 
closed-ended questions to collect quantitative data, followed in the second stage by a smaller subset 
of 30 unstructured qualitative interviews to obtain a richer and deeper understanding.
For the fi rst stage, a spatially stratifi ed sampling procedure was used. This involved conducting 
an equal number of interviews, namely 20, in each of the 10 districts of Mykolayiv. To avoid a spatial 
clustering of respondents, the households were selected for interview by calculating the number of 
roads in each district, and if there were 20 streets, then one household from each street was selected 
for an interview. If nobody answered, the next house on the street was visited until a response was 
achieved. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
surveyed population and displays that the characteristics of the sampled population are similar to the 
characteristics of the broader population of Mykolayiv.
Following a pilot survey of 10 interviews conducted in 2009, which resulted in the deletion of a 
direct question on wider cash-in-hand work due to the unwillingness of participants to respond and a 
resultant loss of rapport, the full survey of 200 structured face-to-face interviews was undertaken. The 
structured interview schedule fi rst asked participants how they got various everyday tasks completed, 
followed by questions on what types of work they did (both paid and unpaid) for others and how they 
acquired various goods and services. Following this, and as displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix, a 
range of questions were asked about their use of blat including their attitude towards blat, whether 
they had used blat to obtain help in various spheres, including health services, who had helped them, 
why they had asked for help and if the person helping them had been rewarded and if so, how. This 
was followed by open-ended questions on whether it would have been possible to achieve the same 
result without using connections and if not, why not. In the realm of gaining access to health services, 
the questions were confi ned to three key areas: obtaining help from a local doctor’s surgery, receiving 
a hospital bed, and reducing the cost of an operation, and the time limit was confi ned to the last 
seven years. 
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The respondent was then asked the same questions but in relation to whether they had helped 
others, who they had helped, why they had helped them, whether they had been rewarded for help 
them, and if so, how. The fi nal section of the questionnaire asked open-ended questions regarding the 
relative importance of blat compared with the use of money in gaining access to goods and services 
or for circumventing formal procedures, both in the past and today. 
For the second stage, namely the unstructured qualitative interviews, maximum variation sampling 
was used. Following the 200 face-to-face structured interviews, 30 participants were selected for 
an in-depth follow-up interview by selecting participants from the main survey that maximise the 
diversity relevant to the research question (i.e. blat). Thus, those who help out others were selected 
(e.g. ranging from a hospital consultant to a receptionist at a local surgeon’s offi  ce), those seldom 
if ever helping others, followed by those who had sought help via blat, ranging from aﬄ  uent well-
connected participants to poorly-connected and less aﬄ  uent participants, and those who had not. 
These in-depth interviews focused on their use of blat and sought answers in relation to each of 
the above hypotheses, more precisely their views on: whether the participant thought blat remains 
commonly used in the health services sector; whether those with connections and access to health 
services now treat them as commodities to sell rather than provide them as a friendly favour; whether 
the informal payments made for providing access to health services are bribes, not gifts received for 
providing friendly help; and whether informal payments have replaced blat as a tool for gaining access 
to health services.
Analytical approach
To analyse the resultant data from the fi rst stage structured interview, which was mostly composed 
of closed-ended questions, the data was collated using the Statistical Package of the Social Sciences 
(SPSS), and the descriptive results were produced using simple cross-tabulations. Given the nature of 
the hypotheses to be tested, the use of descriptive fi ndings was deemed appropriate and the use of 
more complex analytical methods, such as multivariate regression analysis, inappropriate due to the 
small sample size involved.
Table 1: Socio-demographic profi le of sampled population
Characteristic % of sampled population % of Mykolayiv population
Gender:
  Men 44 48
  Women 56 52
Age of adult population:
  18-30 22 25
  30-55 29 35
  55+ 49 40
Nationality:
  Ukrainians 74 78.2
  Russians 22 18.0
  Belarusians 2 0.7
  Bulgarians 1 0.6
  Moldovans 0 0.5
  Jews 0 0.4
  Armenians 1 0.3
  Others 0 1.3
Source: authors’ survey
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With regard to the 30 unstructured face-to-face interviews in the second stage, meanwhile, 
and given that the themes for analysis had been already defi ned by the hypotheses arising out 
of the literature review, content analysis was employed (see Bryman, 2012; Hay, 2005). Following 
familiarisation with the data that had been collected, and given that this unstructured interview was 
loosely based on questions posed regarding each of the hypotheses to be tested as described above, the 
fi rst stage in the analysis was to code or sort the data collected according to the responses regarding 
each of the hypotheses. Following this initial coding and/or sorting, the second step was to read their 
answers to each hypothesis and identify the various diff erences and commonalities in their answers. 
This involved, for example, further coding and sorting answers according to whether they viewed blat 
positively or negatively, whether the respondents saw paying for health services as a bribe or a gift for 
friendly help, and whether they thought informal payments had replaced blat or not. Following this 
second stage coding, a third and fi nal stage involved searching for more nuanced interpretations of 
the situation beyond such binary either/or readings of the situation, so that a further, more nuanced 
coding and sorting of their responses could be achieved. This coding was undertaken manually by 
highlighting on the transcripts, using a colour coding scheme to code the diff erent types of responses 
to each hypothesis. Below, we report the fi ndings. 
Results: Evaluating the role of blat in the Ukrainian health services sector
As Lekhan, Rudiy & Nolte (2004) point out, the provision of health services in Ukraine has undergone 
a radical transformation since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and there is now also a burgeoning 
private sector. Health services, nevertheless, remain offi  cially a free public service. For those working 
in the health services sector, wages are low, both compared with international rates and relative to 
other professions nationally. A paediatrician at a public sector maternity hospital, for example, earns 
an offi  cial salary of 2000 hryvnias per month ($US250), and in the private sector salaries are only 10-15 
per cent higher (Lekhan, 2010: 68). While the price of foodstuff s is relatively low mainly due to lower 
quality control (1 litre of milk costs approximately US$1, a loaf of bread US$0.80 and a Big Mac is 
US$2), imported consumer goods such as clothing or cars are more expensive than in Western Europe 
due to import taxes. The consequence is that many employed in health services work overtime, for 
which they receive one and a half or double wage rates. As an ophthalmologist interviewed during 
the course of the research, who had two offi  cial part-time jobs at public outpatient hospitals where 
she has both pryiom (surgery hours) and cherguvannia (accident and emergency hours) commented, 
‘If you work on single rate, you have nothing to eat. If you work on double rate, you have no time to 
eat’. This provides an important background context for understanding the contemporary role of blat 
in the health services sector in Mykolayiv. 
The prevalence of blat
When asked whether they had used blat in the past seven years to obtain surgical help from a local 
doctor, to get a hospital bed or to reduce the cost of an operation, 56 per cent of participants asserted 
they had done so. Moreover, some 21 per cent of participants had arranged for somebody they knew 
to gain access to health services either due to their direct employment in this sector or more usually 
by acting as a third party to help them establish contact with a relevant person. Consequently, the use 
of blat to obtain these health services remains a widespread practice. 
The main reasons given for using blat when acquiring health services are to receive a better quality 
service (53 per cent), to get information (19 per cent), to jump the queue (9 per cent), to circumvent 
other formal procedures (8 per cent), to be introduced to useful people (6 per cent) and to reduce 
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the price (4 per cent). To understand why in the majority of cases blat is used to receive a better 
quality service, it is necessary to understand that there is a widespread belief that having personal 
connections with doctors is important and signifi cantly infl uences the quality of treatment received 
as a patient. As a manager of a fi rm stated:
If you personally know the chief physician, you will get absolutely diff erent treatment. I always go to the 
doctors pulling strings. Once I recommended a good doctor to my sister but without introducing her to 
him. She visited this doctor without being patronised fi rst and did not receive proper quality and care 
from him as I did.
Consequently, in line with the literature on blat in post-Soviet states but contrary to the literature 
on corruption in health services, this study supports the hypothesis (H1) that blat remains commonly 
used in the health services sector. Is it the case, however, as the literature on post-Soviet states 
suggests, that although the practice of blat persists, its character has changed (e.g. Ledeneva, 2013)?  
Has the character of blat changed?
In the literature on blat in post-Soviet states, the argument is that whilst in Soviet society money 
played only a small role and using personal networks meant everything, under post-socialism, the new 
shortage is money and although the principle of using personal social networks for accessing services 
remains the same, the form of blat has changed  (Ledeneva, 2013). Whereas in the Soviet period, blat 
was used as a form of friendly help to enable people in one’s personal network gain access to services, 
in post-Soviet market societies, personal networks are increasingly treated as a commodity and gifts 
and/or money are received and given (Arnstberg & Boren, 2003; Ledeneva, 2009, 2013).
To evaluate this, two questions were asked. First, when the respondents stated that they had 
received help in accessing health services, they were asked, ‘How do you reward your connections?’. 
Second, when they provided help or acted as a third party in providing access to health services, they 
were asked, ‘What do you usually receive as a reward?’. The participants were given fi ve options with 
regard to the type of reward given and received: cash; gifts; quid pro quo; just ‘thank you’, or ‘other’ 
which include rewards such as ‘a plate of soup’ and ‘drinking beer together’. If participants stated 
that cash or a gift was given or received, this intimates the monetisation of blat, whereas if some 
other service (quid pro quo) is provided or they just say ‘thank you’, this intimates that non-monetised 
forms of blat in the traditional form of a reciprocal exchange of favours persist in the contemporary 
post-Soviet era. 
As Table 2 reveals, 52 per cent of those receiving help in accessing health services had rewarded 
this with either a monetary payment (29 per cent) or a gift (23 per cent). As such, there appears to 
be a monetisation of blat. However, just 22 per cent of those giving help with access, which includes 
health practitioners and third parties who arrange access, stated that they received cash or a gift. 
Table 2: Rewards for blat in the health services sector: by the type of reward
Cash Gift
Quid pro 
quo
Just ‘thank 
you’
Other Total
Reward given for 
favours received
No. 40 31 33 25 7 136
29% 23% 24% 18% 5 100%
Reward received for 
favours done
No. 6 7 20 25 1 59
10% 12% 34% 42% 2% 100%
Source: authors’ survey
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Recognising that health practitioners receive cash or a gift in 70 per cent of cases, but third parties in 
only 10 per cent of cases, this discrepancy between how those receiving and giving help are rewarded 
is explained. While recipients are thinking of how they reimbursed the health practitioners rather 
than any third party arranger, those providing blat include a large number of third party arrangers 
who had not received cash or a gift for their services.  
These results, therefore, only partially support the hypothesis (H2) that those with connections 
and access to health services now treat them as commodities to sell rather than provide them as a 
friendly favour. They reveal that although blat has been to some extent monetised, the so-called old-
style blat in the form of non-monetised friendly help persists. 
To understand this persistence of old-style blat, it is necessary to analyse the nature of the social 
relations between those engaged in monetised and non-monetised blat. As Table 3 reveals, a large 
proportion of blat involves helping close social relations such as kin, friends, neighbours or work 
colleagues. Indeed, 65 per cent receiving help with connections obtain this from close social relations 
and over 85 per cent of those providing help do so for kin, friends, neighbours and work colleagues, 
rather than for distant social relations. In the majority of cases where close social relations are 
involved, monetary compensation is absent; 83 per cent of blat between relatives and friends are non-
monetised. As a hospital doctor asserted, 
When our relatives need health treatment or a consultation, we always help them with our connections; 
we refer them to good doctors we know, help them to avoid queuing. In return, we can always ask for 
help as well. For example, we often ask my father’s cousin, who is retired, to do small odd jobs. I once 
tried to give her 20 hryvnias for the favour, but she refused. But we always help their family and their 
children and grandchildren and they help us and our parents. We never pay for this help.
This is not the case when distant social relations are involved, such as friends of friends or 
distant acquaintances. When the blat is for or by distant social relations, 70 per cent was monetised. 
Consequently, traditional non-monetised blat in the form of friendly help persists in Ukraine but 
mostly for close social relations. The use of monetary relations, meanwhile, is when distant social 
relations are involved. This permeation of monetary relations in blat between more distant social 
relations, however, is not universal. As a woman solicitor stated,
Due to my profession, I communicate a lot with people in various occupations. This gives me an 
opportunity to use these connections quid pro quo, such as when visiting a doctor.
Hence, the closer the social relation, the more blat resembles traditional Soviet-style friendly help. 
The more distant the social relations become between the parties involved, the more commoditised 
the provision of help becomes and the more gifts and/or money are received and given. As such, the 
second hypothesis (H2) that those with connections and access to health services now treat them 
as commodities that they sell rather than provide them as a friendly favour is not totally confi rmed. 
Although this is the case when distant social relations are involved, the so-called old-style blat in 
Table 3. Nature of relationship between the supplier and receiver of blat
Relative Friend Neighbour Colleague Other
Receive favours from: 
No. 30 38 9 18 52
20% 26% 6% 12% 35%
Provide favours for:
No. 31 30 14 15 16
29% 28% 13% 14% 15%
Source: authors’ survey
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the form of non-monetised friendly favours persists when closer social relations are involved.  This, 
nevertheless, is not the only way in which monetary relations are encroaching informally into the 
provision of health services.
Illicit payments for health services: bribes or gifts?
Of those who had visited their local doctor for surgery, received a hospital bed or entered hospital 
for an operation, 70 per cent had made an informal payment in the form of either cash or a gift to 
hospital staff . This is because in Ukraine it is widely accepted that although health services are free 
in the public health sector, there are informal ‘tariff s’ for doctors’ consultations. As a manager of a 
fi rm stated,
There is a standard tariff  you pay unoffi  cially for a doctor’s consultation: 50 hryvnias. This gives you 
some confi dence of being treated properly, with due carefulness.
Indeed, this was reinforced by the vast majority of patients who commonly stated that giving a gift 
or monetary payment is ‘mandatory’, ‘compulsory’ and ‘you have to do it or you will not be treated’. 
However, although patients often think a ‘standard’ tariff  exists and is compulsory, the doctors 
themselves have a diff erent view. As a young female doctor explained, 
Sometimes thankful patients bring me fl owers or sweets; sometimes they tuck money into my pocket 
after the appointment… The doctors do not have any tariff s for their consultation. Even though patients 
sometimes give me money, the amounts vary.
Or as another doctor commented, 
Sometimes I bring home a bunch of bananas, sometimes 30 hryvnias or several chocolate boxes, 
and there are also days when I receive nothing.
For others, however, particular areas of medicine have set tariff s regarding the level of informal 
payments required. As a male doctor working in obstetrics commented, 
In the maternity hospital, obstetricians usually receive 2,000-3,000 hryvnias in cash for each delivery. 
From this amount they give 20 hryvnias to a nurse and 100 hryvnias to a paediatrician.
To the remark by the interviewer that such informal payments might be considered a bribe and 
could be prosecuted, he responded,
Nobody fi ghts this ‘corruption’ in hospitals. The state cannot provide doctors with an adequate salary, 
but doctors need to survive. If the informal earnings of healthcare workers were prosecuted, everybody 
would leave. Therefore, the state turns a blind eye.
For this doctor, therefore, payments are not ‘bribes’ but gifts from the patient displaying their 
appreciation and gratefulness. As he explains,
Have you ever visited a doctor in a public hospital who refused to treat you without being paid or 
extorted money from you? … I do not consider that money given as a bribe; it is gift of gratitude by the 
patient.
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In his eyes, therefore, payments are an expression of gratitude by patients, not least in recognition 
of the low pay of doctors in the state system, and arise out of the failure of the state to fulfi l its part 
of the bargain by insuffi  ciently rewarding public sector workers. Indeed, as Polese (2008: 53) has 
accurately asserted, ‘If I receive it, it is a gift. If I demand it, then it is a bribe’. For the majority of 
people working in health services, their view is that they do not demand such informal payments so 
it is not a bribe.
In the eyes of patients, therefore, the hypothesis (H3) is validated that payments made for providing 
access to health services are bribes since these are seen as compulsory. However, from the viewpoint 
of the staff , these are gifts voluntarily given rather than bribes demanded.  
Is money replacing blat?
Given the widespread use of informal payments when accessing health services, is it therefore the 
case that blat is less important? Is money now suffi  cient to achieve what before required access to 
personal networks to attain? As an older person asserted,
In the Soviet times, it was enough to call the acquaintance and the issue was solved without money. 
Such acquaintances were called ‘pozvonochnye’ [directly translated as ‘vertebrates’ but comes from the 
word ‘zvonok’ which means ‘a call’]. There are no more ‘pozvonochnye’ today. Everything is done for 
money.
For him, therefore, money has replaced the need for blat. An unemployed woman expressed a 
similar view:
Today money is more important than connections. In any institution, there are people who are ready 
to carry out any request for money. You do not need to have connections in hospitals to obtain a health 
certifi cate from the medical board. It is enough to speak to a district nurse and for 100 hryvnias you get 
any certifi cate the next day. 
For these participants, therefore, those occupying positions that can provide access to assets are 
using them to accumulate money, and it does not appear that blat is important any longer in this 
post-socialist market economy.
These participants, however, are exceptions. Most participants adopt a more nuanced view of the 
relationship between informal payments and blat. Rather than viewing money as becoming a substitute 
for blat, they adopt the view that although money is suffi  cient without blat, and blat is suffi  cient 
without money, combining money and blat is the most appropriate and eff ective way of securing a 
good quality service when acquiring health services. Indeed, this more nuanced understanding was 
not foreseen as a possibility before conducting the qualitative interviews and arose out of the third 
stage of the content analysis of the unstructured interviews. As a woman aged 26-35 years old asserts, 
Money is important today but connections are still in use. I lived in Kyiv and came back to my native 
city especially to give birth because my parents are doctors and have big connections here. In spite of a 
small offi  cial payment of 200 hryvnias [rather than the usual 2000 hryvnias due to her connections] to 
the hospital cash offi  ce and 20 hryvnias cash-in-hand to the nurse, I obtained very good treatment. And 
these people are not our close friends, just colleagues.
Another example of how blat and informal payments are best combined is the following statement 
by a young woman:
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According to the law, I have the right to obtain a sanatorium voucher for 20 per cent of its price every 
fi ve years because of my health condition. My acquaintance is responsible for the distribution of these 
vouchers. Last time I brought her a souvenir from the sanatorium and now I hope to obtain a discounted 
voucher next year as well. It is easier ‘to make friends’ with the authorised person for 100 hryvnias than 
to pay 3000 hryvnias full price.
Despite the advent of informal payments for health services, it does not obviate the need for 
personal networks. Instead, the notion of being well-connected remains very important in modern 
Ukrainian society and a widespread belief remains that informal relations with health service 
professionals are still important.
Moreover, what is perhaps surprising, given that these practices are forms of corruption as well 
as of nepotism and cronyism, is that the participants in this survey showed no reticence in openly 
discussing them and they engaged in these activities openly without any apparent shame, remorse or 
guilt. Indeed, when asked whether they view blat positively or negatively, 48 per cent of participants 
expressed a very positive or positive attitude towards blat, 40 per cent were neutral and only 12 per 
cent viewed blat negatively or extremely negatively. Consequently, there is little questioning of blat 
even though its character has changed.
Consequently, this study does not validate the hypothesis (H4) that informal payments have 
replaced blat as a tool for gaining access to health services, as assumed by much of the literature 
on corruption in the health services sector that discusses only informal payments and ignores blat 
in the mistaken belief that illicit monetary payments have replaced it. Instead, this study shows that 
although illicit monetary payments are suffi  cient without blat, and blat is suffi  cient without illicit 
monetary payments, combining money and blat is widely seen as the most appropriate and eff ective 
way of acquiring good quality health services.
Conclusions
This paper has evaluated whether the illicit practice of using personal networks to gain preferential 
access to goods and services, or to circumvent formal procedures, known as blat, persists in post-
socialist Ukraine. To do this, the usage of blat when acquiring health services in Mykolayiv in Ukraine 
was investigated.  In line with the literature on blat in post-Soviet states, but contrary to the literature 
on corruption in health services, this study supports the hypothesis (H1) that blat remains commonly 
used in the health services sector. Some 56 per cent had used personal networks when visiting a local 
surgeon, getting a hospital bed or seeking to reduce the cost of an operation. Contrary to literature 
on blat in post-Soviet states, however, the hypothesis (H2) that those with connections and access to 
health services now treat them as commodities to sell, rather than provide them as a friendly favour, 
is only partly supported. Traditional style blat persists. Only 52 per cent of those using blat in the past 
seven years to access these services had reimbursed those helping them in the form of either cash or 
a gift. When closer social relations are involved, old-style blat based on friendly help persists. The use 
of monetary relations is largely when distant social relations are involved.
However, this is not the only way in which monetary relations are encroaching informally into 
the provision of health services. Some 70 per cent of participants who had been to a local surgeon, 
received a hospital bed or entered hospital for an operation had made an informal payment in the 
form of either cash or a gift. Examining the hypothesis (H3) that these informal payments made 
for providing access to health services are bribes, not gifts received for providing friendly help, the 
fi nding is that this hypothesis is valid in the eyes of patients that payments made for providing access 
to health services are bribes since these are seen as compulsory. However, from the viewpoint of the 
staff , these are gifts given voluntarily rather than demanded bribes.
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However, this does not mean that the hypothesis (H4) that money has replaced blat (H4) is 
supported, as purported by much of the literature on blat in post-Soviet states and the broader 
literature on corruption in the health services sector. Rather than viewing money as replacing blat, 
participants adopted the view that even if money is suffi  cient without blat, and blat is suffi  cient 
without money, combining money and blat is the most appropriate and eff ective way of securing a 
good quality service. This was not foreseen as a possibility before conducting the third stage content 
analysis of the in-depth unstructured follow-up interviews and is thus a new fi nding that emerged 
from the data itself.
Therefore, this paper reveals that blat in post-Soviet market societies needs to be re-theorised. 
Although blat remains commonly used, it has not commoditised as the literature on post-Soviet states 
often suggests. It continues to take the form of non-monetised friendly favours when close social 
relations are involved. Only when the social relations are more distant are personal connections a 
commodity bought and sold. When seeking preferential access to goods and services to circumvent 
formal procedures, moreover, illicit informal payments have not replaced blat, as assumed in the 
literature on corruption in the health services sector. Blat persists, and although illicit informal 
payments are suffi  cient without blat, and blat suffi  cient without illicit informal payments, combining 
the two is widely seen as the most appropriate and eff ective way of securing good quality service.
The outcome is that although the legacy of Soviet times is to view blat neutrally or positively, 
which is a view adopted by 88 per cent of the surveyed population, with only 12 per cent viewing it 
negatively, the commodifi cation of blat means that it is becoming an example of the darker side of 
social capital. Whether it takes the form of old-style friendly favours or new-style commodifi ed blat 
involving illicit informal payments, this practice results in cronyism, nepotism and corruption, and 
supports allocation based on favouritism rather than merit.
Tackling this illicit practice will be diffi  cult, while a positive or neutral attitude persists towards 
its use based on the legacy of the Soviet economy of shortages. What, therefore, is the way forward? 
One policy approach is to seek to eradicate it through tougher penalties for those caught engaging in 
it, although whether there is the political will to do this is doubtful. Another approach is to provide 
incentives and make it easier to receive health services without the need for blat and informal 
monetary payments. This could be achieved by raising the salaries of hospital staff  to such a level that 
the staff  will no longer feel they need informal payments and patients will no longer feel the need to 
provide such gifts and donations. A fi nal approach is to run awareness raising campaigns about the 
negative eff ects of blat and informal payments and the positive eff ects of meritocratic values across 
the society. These policy approaches, moreover, are not mutually exclusive. They can be combined in 
various ways, such as by running awareness raising campaigns alongside improving the wage levels 
of hospital staff  and then to follow this up with tougher penalties and sanctions for those failing to 
comply. Whatever approach is adopted, however, what is certain is that the persistence of blat and 
its new combination with informal payments for accessing free public services cannot continue. A 
laissez-faire approach, therefore, is not an option.
What is now required is to evaluate critically whether a similar shift in the character of blat is 
occurring in other sectors and countries in the post-Soviet world. Perhaps more importantly, greater 
attention could now be paid to evaluating critically whether the character of guanxi, wasta, jeitinho 
and ‘pulling strings’ is changing in similar ways, and documenting the negative implications rather 
than taking it as a normal social practice. If this paper thus engenders a wider evaluation of whether 
this practice needs to be re-theorised more negatively, along with greater debate on what needs to be 
done to eradicate this illicit practice, then it will have achieved its objectives.
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Appendix 1: Questions on blat in structured interview schedule
Q1: What is your attitude towards getting things done by pulling strings/using connections/ blat?
1 2 3 4 5
Very positive Rather positive Neutral Rather negative Very negative  
DOES ANYBODY HELP YOU?
Fill in Table 1 answering questions 2-4 for each sphere
Table 1: Spheres in which you have used connections top gain access in the past 7 years
Spheres Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Health services: local surgery, hospital bed or operation 
Solving problems with the traffi  c police, registration of a vehicle and MOT 
Finding a job
Education: Places in primary-secondary and higher education
Legal services and courts
Army conscription
Everyday services at better quality or better price
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets
Consumer goods
Foodstuff s 
Communicating with local authorities in your business matters  (e.g. tax 
inspection)
Q2: Has anybody helped you to achieve a goal / solve a problem / receive extra benefi ts in the past 7 
years? 
1. No
2. Yes, to circumvent the rules / laws / bureaucracy
3. Yes, to make rules / laws work
4. Yes, to reduce fi nal price
5. Yes, to improve quality
6. Yes, to get information
7. Yes, to be introduced to useful people
8. Yes, to receive service without a queue
9. Yes, to maintain connections
10. Yes, other ______________
Q3: If yes, how did you reward your connections? (several answers are possible)  
1 2 3 4 5
With cash With a gift Quid pro quo Just ‘thank you’ Other  _________
Q4: What is your relationship with the people you usually ask for help?
1 2 3 4 5
Relative Friend Neighbour Colleague Other __________
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Q5: Would you have been able to achieve this aim without connections? YES?NO.  If NO, why?
DO YOU HELP ANYBODY?
Fill in Table 2 answering questions 6-8 for each sphere
Table 2: Spheres in which you have helped others gain access using your own connections in the past 
7 years
Spheres Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
Health services: local surgery, hospital or bed and operation 
Solving problems with the traffi  c police, registration of a vehicle and MOT 
Finding a job
Education: Places in primary-secondary and higher education
Legal services and courts
Army conscription
Everyday services at better quality or better price
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets
Consumer goods
Foodstuff s 
Communicating with local authorities in your business matters  (e.g. tax 
inspection)
Q6: Have you helped anybody to solve problems in the following spheres in the past 7 years? 
1. No
2. Yes, to circumvent the rules / laws / bureaucracy
3. Yes, to make rules / laws work
4. Yes, to reduce fi nal price
5. Yes, to improve quality
6. Yes, to provide them with information
7. Yes, to introduce them to useful people
8. Yes, to enable them to receive service without a queue
9. Yes, to maintain connections
10. Yes, other ______________
Q7: If yes, what do you usually receive as a reward for your services? (several answers are possible)
1 2 3 4 5
With cash With a gift Quid pro quo Just ‘thank you’ Other  _________
Q8: Who are the people you usually do favours for? 
1 2 3 4 5
Relative Friend Neighbour Colleague Other __________
Q9: What is more important now, in 90’s, in Soviet times: connections or money? Why? Please, give 
examples.
